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TRADEMARKS AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
OIL AND WATER?
OR CHOCOLATE AND PEANUT BUTTER?
By Megan M. Carpenter*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been a growing discourse at the
intersection of intellectual property and human rights. Whether
there is a direct connection between intellectual property, or the
subjects of intellectual property, on the one hand, and human
rights, on the other, has been the subject of lively debate.1 Most
recently, the discussion has turned to the field of trademarks,
which has prompted the question, Are trademarks human rights?
In this article I seek to explore this question, and to consider
directly whether there is a proper place for trademarks within the
human rights framework-whether trademarks and human rights
are immiscible, like oil and water, or whether they are a great
combination that creates a whole that is bigger than the sum of its
parts, like chocolate and peanut butter.
The analysis begins with a discussion of human rights
generally, both as those rights are defined and as they are realized
within an overarching legal structure. Next, I examine the
inclusion of intellectual property rights within international
human rights instruments and explore the dimensions of
implementation and interpretation of intellectual property rights
pursuant to those instruments. I conclude that, in contrast to
copyrights and patent rights, trademark rights are not the types of
rights that are considered to be human rights per se. The third
part of the analysis discusses the inclusion of intellectual property
within the property rights provisions of the European Convention
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. This paper
is based on a presentation given at the International Trademark Association (INTA)
Leadership Meeting in November 2008. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of
Joseph Barber and Keith Hirokawa in preparing this article, and is indebted to J.W. Cox,
whose assistance was invaluable.
1. See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or
Coexistence? 5 Minn. Intell. Prop. Rev. 47 (2003); Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human
Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 16 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 971 (2007); Peter K. Yu,
Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework, 40 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 1039 (2007); Mary W.S. Wong, Toward an Alternative Normative Framework
for Copyright: From Private Property to Human Rights, 26 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 775
(2009).
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of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Under the
jurisprudence of the European Court, intellectual property rights
fall squarely within the parameters of property rights, and a
recent opinion by the Grand Chamber makes clear the inclusion of
trademark registrations and applications within that property
right. The fourth part examines the human right to property,
including how that right has developed in both breadth and depth
over time. Next, I examine trademark rights as property rights,
and consider the question, Are trademark rights property rights
within United States trademark law? While historically there has
been great resistance to defining trademark rights as a form of
property right, I posit that this recalcitrance has grown out of both
a misconception of the nature of property rights and a lack of
recognition of the nature of trademark rights in relation to other
forms of property rights. In the last part, I conclude that
trademarks, while not human rights per se, can be human rights
insofar as they exist as a form of property right, and caution that
to the extent that trademark rights are viewed from the lens of
human rights, they must be balanced with other rights as well,
such as the right to culture.
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
WITHIN A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
A. Human Rights Are Fundamental Rights
Inherent to All Human Beings
A full explication of the place of trademarks within the human
rights framework, if there is such a place, must consider a most
basic question: What are human rights? At a fundamental level,
human rights are thought of as rights inherent to all human
beings, whatever their nationality, place of residence, sex, national
or ethnic origin, color, religion, language, or other status. They are,
quite simply, "timeless expressions of fundamental entitlements of
the human person."2 As a matter of first steps, when we think
about whether anything is a human right, a logical place to turn to
is the United Nations, which has played a front and center role
with regard to the promotion of international human rights since
the mid-twentieth century. The United Nations has created a
2. U.N. Comm. on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 17: The
Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests
Resulting from any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He or She is the
Author (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 15(1)(c)),
Jan. 12, 2006, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 [hereinafter General Comment No. 17],
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/441543594.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2009). For an
interpretation, see Helfer (2007), supra note 1, at 997-1000.
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global framework for protecting fundamental human rights,
including multiple declarations and multilateral treaties on
human rights. These agreements, both declarations and treaties,
contain provisions that are commonly cited when asserting that
intellectual property is a human right.3
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and,
really, the entire United Nations international human rights
regime, were born from the wreckage of a post-World War II
environment and culture, and they very much reflect the political
climate of the time.4 The Allied nations were determined to
establish a peacekeeping structure for international cooperation
that would prevent widespread trauma and violence from
occurring in the future. 5 In 1945, after U.S. President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and
Russian Premier Joseph Stalin met at Yalta and agreed to form "a
general international organization to maintain peace and
security," the United Nations was established and the U.N.
Charter was drafted and signed.6
Following the establishment of the United Nations, the UDHR
became one of the first international documents based on the tenet
3. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 27, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] ("(1)
Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy
the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. (2) Everyone has the right
to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or
artistic production of which he is the author."); International Covenant on Economic Social
and Cultural Rights art. 15(1)(b), (c), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5 [hereinafter ICESCR]
(recognizing the right "[t]o enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications" and
"[t]o benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author").
4. Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights 181 (1998).
Lauren notes that those who endured the traumas of the Depression, Hitler's Third Reich,
and World War II sought to learn from the perceived mistakes of the past to create a lasting
peace with rights. See also Yu, supra note 1, at 1050 (citing Matthew C.R. Craven, The
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on Its
Development 6 (1995) ("As a reaction to events prior to and during the Second World War,
the allies, and later the international community as a whole, came to the belief that the
establishment of the new world order should be based upon a commitment to the protection
of human rights and fundamental freedoms."); Johannes Morsink, The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent xiv (1999) ("[W]ithout the
delegates' shared moral revulsion against [the Holocaust] the Declaration would never have
been written.")).
5. Lauren, supra note 4, at 181.
6. U.N. Department of Public Information, Milestones in United Nations History:
Yalta Conference (1997), http://www.un.org/Overview/milesto4.htm (last visited Apr. 24,
2009).
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that human beings have inherent and fundamental rights.7 While
the Declaration is not legally binding, it is the cornerstone, if not
the foundation, of our contemporary human rights regime, and
sets standards that are codified in multiple international treaties.
It contains 30 articles specifying particular individual rights. The
first two articles set a foundation of equality and basic dignity for
all people, and the remaining rights encompass both civil and
political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights.
The United Nations was itself an unprecedented effort at
international cooperation, and the drafting of the main human
rights instruments at the heart of this effort was an amalgamation
of cooperation and conflicting ideologies. The first draft of
provisions for the UDHR, which were compiled by John
Humphrey, the director of the Division on Human Rights at the
United Nations, did not include protection for the moral and/or
material interests of creators, but did include "the right to
participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts
and to share in the benefits of science," a version of which
eventually became Article 27(1). There was little controversy over
that article. There was some discussion as to whether to stipulate
that "the development of science must serve the interests of
progress and democracy and the cause of international peace and
cooperation," which grew out of concern by the Soviet Union
regarding the United States' sharing secrets about the atomic
bomb.9 The additional phrase was rejected in the final version of
the document, in part because of (unsurprising) widespread
difficulties defining precisely the word "democracy."'10  Some
delegates were also passionate about the inclusion of the word
"freely," believing that it was inadequate to state that everyone
has the right to cultural participation without further emphasizing
complete freedom "to protect ... from harmful pressures which
were only too frequent in recent history."" The final provision, a
product of cooperation and compromise, reads, "[E]veryone has the
right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to
7. Previous international agreements generally were based in positivism, the idea
that international rights and obligations exist only after those rights are recognized in
national legislation. See Yu, supra note 1, at 1045-46 (citing Richard Falk, Cultural
Foundations for the International Protection of Human Rights, in Human Rights in Cross-
Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus 44 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim ed., 1992)).
8. Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights 274 (2001) (quoting Article 44 of the Humphrey Draft).
9. Yu, supra note 1, at 1053 (citing Morsink, supra note 4, at 61-62). For a detailed
history of the drafting process of the UDHR, see Yu, supra note 1, at 1047-75.
10. Yu, supra note 1, at 1053 (citing Morsink, supra note 4, at 61-62).
11. Yu, supra note 1, at 1053 (citing Morsink, supra note 4, at 218 (quoting Peruvian
delegate Jos6 Encinas)).
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enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its
benefits."
12
In contrast to the relatively smooth adoption of Article 27(1),
the process for inclusion of Article 27(2) was fraught with
controversy. 13 The protection of creators' moral interests did not
arise in the first draft, but was added in a later draft compiled by
Rene Cassin after further discussions of the Drafting Committee. 14
The Cassin draft provided initially that "authors of all artistic,
literary, scientific works and inventors shall retain, in addition to
just remuneration for their labour, a moral right on their work
and/or discovery which shall not disappear, even after such a work
or discovery shall have become the common property of
mankind."15 The draft article seems to implicate material interests
in addition to moral ones, through the use of the phrase "just and
favourable remuneration," as well as the seeming negative
implication that creators will, at least for a time, have exclusive
property rights in their creations.1 6 Some scholars have suggested
that the Humphrey draft assumed material interests in
intellectual property as well, by virtue of other property rights
provisions.1 7 The draft provision was the subject of much
controversy, and was objected to by various states on multiple
grounds, including particularly the moral rights provisions.18
Delegates split over growing Cold War ideologies. In the end, the
product of compromise afforded every individual "the right to the
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the
author."' 9 This provision has served as the model language for both
international and regional human rights instruments for the last
half century.
It is no surprise to discover that enforcement mechanisms for
international human rights are categorically inadequate. Setting
aspirational standards for human rights in the interest of
international cooperation and the well-being of citizens around the
world is one thing, but creating legally cognizable individual rights
vis-A-vis domestic sovereign entities is another matter entirely.
12. UDHR, supra note 3, art. 27(1).
13. Yu, supra note 1, at 1054.
14. Id.
15. Glendon, supra note 8, at 275-80 (quoting Article 43 of the Cassin Draft).
16. UDHR, supra note 3, art. 23(3).
17. Yu, supra note 1, at 1052.
18. Id. at 1054 ("While the additional element of moral rights provided the provision's
raison d'ftre, it raised considerable concern for the United Kingdom and United States").
19. UDHR, supra note 3, art. 27(2).
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The UDHR, as such, does not and is not intended to create specific
legal binding rights and duties between individuals and the
states.20 Rather, as a Declaration, it is intended to establish what
Eleanor Roosevelt called a common standard of rights "for all
peoples and all nations."21 In contrast to a legally enforceable
instrument, the UDHR was designed to proclaim a united vision of
human rights for the world, a world that, looking forward, would
believe in the "inherent dignity" of the individual and the
"inalienable rights of all members of the human family."22 It has
served this function well, and has become a lighted path to guide
states, both collectively and individually, in the direction of
fundamental human rights.
2. International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) was adopted by the United Nations in 1966,
although it did not enter into force for another decade, a delay that
perhaps was due in large part to the escalating Cold War and
ideological conflicts between Western capitalist democracies and
Communist regimes. 23 The ICESCR is a legal instrument that is
binding upon its more than 150 States Parties.24 There has been
some debate as to why (and how) intellectual property protection
ended up in the final version of the ICESCR. The ideological
conflicts of the Cold War had only intensified in the time since the
passage of the UDHR, and the future of intellectual property in a
human rights framework was uncertain. In Article 15, however,
the final version of the ICESCR sets out binding protection for the
20. See Audrey R. Chapman, A Human Rights Perspective on Intellectual Property,
Scientific Progress, and Access to the Benefits of Science 2 (1998) (noting that although "the
UDHR is aspirational or advisory in nature" and "does not legally bind member states of the
U.N. to implement it," over time, it "has gradually assumed the status of customary
international law"); Paul Torremans, Is Copyright a Human Right?, 2007 Mich. St. L. Rev.
271, 277 (2007).
21. Lauren, supra note 4, at 234 (citing Searching Study of Human Rights Declaration,
5 U.N. Wkly. Bull. 858 (Nov. 1, 1948)).
22. UDHR, supra note 3, preamble.
23. Yu, supra note 1, at 1069 (quoting Maria Green, International Anti-Poverty Law
Center, Drafting History of Article 15(1)(c) of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights para. 43, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/15 (Oct. 9, 2000),
http://www.unhchr.chltbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/E.C.12.2000.15.En?Opendocument (last visited
Apr. 24, 2009) ("The final vote was straight down cold war faultlines, with the opposed
roster holding Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, USSR, Albania, Bulgaria,
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Iraq . .
24. Helfer (2007), supra note 1, at 988.
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intellectual property rights detailed in the UDHR. 25 The Covenant
provides:
1. The States Parties to the present covenant recognize the
right of everyone:
(a) To take part in cultural life;
(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its
applications;
(c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or
artistic production of which he is the author.
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present
Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall
include those necessary for the conservation, the
development and the diffusion of science and culture.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to
respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research
and creative activity.
26
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(CESCR) is the body charged with monitoring the implementation
of the Covenant.27 The CESCR is composed of 18 independent
experts, and while it does not have a mechanism to adjudicate
individual complaints, it is responsible for receiving and reviewing
individual reports by States Parties, which detail the actions a
state has taken to implement the provisions of the ICESCR on a
domestic level.28 Thus, the CESCR is charged with both
interpreting the provisions of the Covenant and monitoring its
implementation by more than 150 States Parties. As part of its
interpretive duties, the CESCR publishes "General Comments"
interpreting specific treaty articles or specific human rights
issues.29 While the General Comments do not create legally
binding obligations on the part of States Parties, they do serve a
standard-setting function for the CESCR in reviewing compliance
with the treaty.
30
25. The language in Article 15 of the ICESCR closely tracks that of Article 27 of the
UDHR.
26. ICESCR, supra note 3, art. 15.






3. Regional Human Rights Treaties
Regional human rights treaties buttress the intellectual
property provisions found in the UN instruments, and often
contain language modeled after the UDHR and the ICESCR. The
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, for
example, parallels the ICESCR and provides that "[e]very person
... has the right to the protection of his moral and material
interests as regards his inventions or any literary, scientific or
artistic works of which he is the author.'' 31 The American
Declaration was innovative in providing protection for the moral
and material interests of creators of intellectual property. The
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights
in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1988
provides protection for the interests of creators as well.3
2
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 (ECHR) is one of the most, if
not the most, influential of the regional human rights instruments.
The ECHR creates legal obligations within the European Union,
and has judicial oversight by the European Court of Human
Rights. Like the American Declaration, the ECHR protects
intellectual property rights, albeit through a different approach-
the right to property. 33 The European Court of Human Rights has
held that intellectual property is protected by Article 1 of Protocol
1 to the ECHR, which provides, "Every natural or legal person is
entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions."34 The ECHR
is a powerful regional mechanism for the enforcement of human
rights, including "tens of thousands of complaints each year, and
its jurisdiction extends the length and breadth of the continent,
31. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man art. 13(2), O.A.S. Res. XXX,
adopted by Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), reprinted in Basic
Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82
doc.6 rev.1 at 17 (1992), http://www.hrcr.org/docs/OAS-Declaration/oasrights.html (last
visited Apr. 24, 2009).
32. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the area of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 14(1)(c), O.A.S. T.S. No. 69 (1988),
http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/treaties/a-52.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2009)
[hereinafter Additional Protocol].
33. Laurence R. Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the
European Court of Human Rights, 49 Harv. Int'l L.J. 1, 2 (Winter 2008) (citing Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms protocol 1, art. 1, Mar. 20,
1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 [hereinafter Protocol 1] ("Every natural or legal person is entitled to
the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except
in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general
principles of international law.").
34. Helfer (2008), supra note 33, at 2.
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encompassing 800 million people in forty-seven nations from
Azerbaijan to Iceland and from Portugal to Russia."35
B. What Is Intellectual Property?
Intellectual property refers to "creations of the mind."36 At a
basic level, all forms of intellectual property share many
characteristics of other forms of property, in that intellectual
property is generally considered to be an asset, and as such can, to
the extent of the rights, be bought, sold, licensed, exchanged, or
given away, and the intellectual property rights holder has the
ability to prevent its unauthorized use or sale. 37 Intellectual
property is unique because it is intangible in nature and cannot
generally be identified by its own physicality. 38 The World
Intellectual Property Organization divides intellectual property
into two categories: industrial property, which includes inventions
(patents), trademarks, industrial designs, and geographic
indications of source; and copyright, which includes literary and
artistic works such as novels, poems, plays, films, musical works,
software, drawings, paintings, photographs, sculptures, and
architectural designs.39 Copyrights have many layers that can
coexist in separate parties even within the context of a singular
work. Rights of a performing artist, for example, can coexist with
rights in the underlying composition, rights in the sound
recording, and rights of radio broadcasters. 40 Intellectual property
may include a certain shade of color (such as the use of brown as a
trademark for the United Parcel Service), 41 a place of origin (such
as geographical indications for Champagne 42 or Gorgonzola 43), or a
35. Id. at 1.
36. WIPO, What is Intellectual Property?, http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/ (last visited
July 21, 2009). See Megan M. Carpenter, Intellectual Property Law and Indigenous Peoples:
Adapting Copyright Law to the Needs of a Global Community, 7 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J.
51, 56 (2004).
37. Carpenter, supra note 36, at 57.
38. Id.
39. Id. See WIPO, supra note 36.
40. Carpenter, supra note 36, at 57. See WIPO, supra note 36.
41. Carpenter, supra note 36, at 57 (citing U.S. Trademark Ser. No. 76408109 (filed
June 20, 2002), http://tess2.uspto.govbinshowfield?f=doc&state=4006:a7e6Ou.7.1).
42. Carpenter, supra note 36, at 57 (noting '"Champagne' is protected as a geographical
indication in Europe because it refers to a specific wine-producing region of France. In other
markets, such as the United States, the term is viewed as being descriptive." See Australian
Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade, What Does TRIPS Say About the Protection of
Geographical Indications?, http://www.dfat.gov.au/ip/geographicalindications.html).
43. Carpenter, supra note 36, at 57 (citing Geographical Indications, PTC Forum:
Online Journal of the Patent, Trademark & Copyright Research Foundation 2,
900
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shape (such as design patent protection for the COCA-COLA
bottle).44 There are intellectual property implications for plant
varieties, 45 sacred religious and cultural knowledge, 46 and genetic
resources.47 Intellectual property is found on coffee tables, walls,
and in the pantry; in buses; in stores; and in nature. Simply put,
intellectual property is the fruit of human creativity and
invention.
48
C. The Scope of Intellectual Property as a Human Right
General Comment No. 17 of the CESCR provides guidance as
to the scope, implementation, and enforcement by States Parties of
the right of everyone to benefit from the protection of the moral
and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary, or
artistic production of which he or she is the author. Importantly,
the Comment helps to define and distinguish the human rights
aspects of intellectual property from the typical policy objectives of
intellectual property regimes. While the human rights provisions
contained in Article 15 of the ICESCR "safeguard[ ] the personal
link between authors and their creations and between peoples,
communities, or other groups and their collective cultural heritage,
as well as their basic material interests which are necessary to
enable authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living, intellectual
property regimes primarily protect business and corporate
interests and investments."'49  Specifically, while intellectual
property rights can be temporary and limited in nature, human
rights are conceived of as fundamental and enduring. However,
http://www.ptcforum.org/ (follow hyperlink to the right of "Part One: Editorial Comments";
follow hyperlink labeled "10006" beside "Geographical Indications") (last visited Apr. 24,
2009)).
44. Carpenter, supra note 36, at 57 (citing U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 1057884
(registered Feb. 1, 1977), http://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/tarr?regser=serial&entry-73088384)
(last visited Apr. 24, 2009)).
45. Carpenter, supra note 36, at 57. See generally Laurie Anne Whitt, Indigenous
Peoples, Intellectual Property, and the New Imperial Science, 23 Okla. City U.L. Rev. 211
(1998); Craig D. Jacoby & Charles Weiss, Recognizing Property Rights in Traditional
Biocultural Contribution, 16 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 74 (1997).
46. Carpenter, supra note 36, at 57. See generally Lucy M. Moran, Intellectual Property
Law Protection for Traditional and Sacred "Forklife Expressions"-Will Remedies Become
Available to Cultural Authors and Communities?, 6 U. Bait. Intell. Prop. L.J. 99 (1998);
Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual Property
the Answer?, 30 Conn. L. Rev. 1 (Fall 1997).
47. Carpenter, supra note 36, at 57. See generally Whitt, supra note 45; Jacoby &
Weiss, supra note 45.
48. Carpenter, supra note 36, at 57 (citing WIPO, At Home with Invention,
http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/athome.htm) (last visited Apr. 24, 2009)).
49. General Comment No. 17, supra note 2, 2.
both have as their underlying goal the encouragement of "the
active contribution of creators to the arts and sciences and to the
progress of society as a whole." 50 This objective is achieved in
intellectual property regimes often through ensuring the limited
nature of those rights. We protect the rights of creators so that
those individuals will create, and we limit the rights so that the
public can benefit from those creations, in turn so that more
individuals can create. This balance is struck in intellectual
property regimes worldwide, and is made perhaps no clearer than
in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution,
which states as a goal, "To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."
51
General Comment No. 17 notes that States Parties have the
obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill the obligations contained
in Article 15.1(c) of the ICESCR:
The obligation to respect requires States parties to refrain
from interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of
the right to benefit from the protection of the moral and
material interests of the author. The obligation to protect
requires States parties to take measures that prevent third
parties from interfering with the moral and material interests
of authors. Finally, the obligation to fulfil requires States
parties to adopt appropriate legislative, administrative,
budgetary, judicial, promotional and other measures towards
the full realization of article 15, paragraph 1 (c).
52
Creators' rights to benefit from the moral and material
interests of their creations are an intrinsic part of States Parties'
obligations vis-A-vis the other provisions of Article 15, and all must
strive to seek a continual balance to ensure exclusive, if limited,
rights and the dissemination of information to society as a whole.
5 3
The right to take part in cultural life, the right to enjoy the
benefits of scientific progress and its applications, and the freedom
50. Id. 74.
51. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
52. General Comment No. 17, supra note 2, 28 (citing General Comment No. 13
7 46, 47 (1999); General Comment No. 14 T 33 (2000). See also Maastricht Guidelines on
Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, para. 6, Maastricht, 22-26 January
1997).
53. Heifer (2007), supra note 1, at 997 (citing General Comment No. 17, supra note 2,
77 22, 35; see also id. T 11 (stating that nothing in Article 15.1(c) prevents States Parties
from "adopting higher protection standards" in intellectual property treaties or national
laws, "provided that these standards do not unjustifiably limit the enjoyment by others of
their rights under the Covenant")).
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indispensable for scientific research and creative activity are
"mutually reinforcing and reciprocally limitative" with the rights
of creators.
54
Multiple sources speak broadly of intellectual property rights
in the context of Article 15, and sometimes specifically mention
this provision as describing the fundamental rights of individuals
to "copyright, patent, and trademark protection."55 It is relatively
easy to see how copyrights and patents might fall under the
umbrella of this protection. Trademark rights, however, are
materially different. Trademark rights simply are not based in
scientific, literary, or artistic productions. The General Comment
illustrates this distinction through its clarifying interpretation of
the normative content of Article 15.1(c). It defines the individual
who receives protection under that article as a "creator, whether
man or woman, individual or group of individuals, of scientific,
literary or artistic productions, such as, inter alia, writers and
artists."56 The CESCR further interprets "any scientific, literary or
artistic production" to include "creations of the human mind, that
is[,] 'scientific productions', such as scientific publications and
innovations, including knowledge, innovations and practices of
indigenous and local communities, and 'literary and artistic
productions', such as, inter alia, poems, novels, paintings,
sculptures, musical compositions, theatrical and cinematographic
works, performances and oral traditions."57 While copyrights
involve "literary and artistic productions" and patents involve
"scientific productions," trademark rights-although they can be
quite creative-involve neither.
Furthermore, the irrelevance of trademarks to this provision is
supported by the content of the country reports submitted to the
CESCR. As part of their treaty obligations, States Parties are
responsible for submitting country reports that "identify
appropriate indicators and benchmarks designed to monitor, at the
national and international levels," compliance with the provisions
54. General Comment No. 17, supra note 2, 4.
55. See, e.g., A Summary of United Nations Agreements on Human Rights: Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, http://www.hrweb.org/legal/undocs.html (last
visited Apr. 24, 2009).
56. General Comment No. 17, supra note 2, 7. "This follows from the words
everyone', 'he' and 'author', which indicate that the drafters of that article seemed to have
believed authors of scientific, literary or artistic productions to be natural persons, without
at that time realizing that they could also be groups of individuals. Under the existing
international treaty protection regimes, legal entities are included among the holders of
intellectual property rights. However, as noted above, their entitlements, because of their
different nature, are not protected at the level of human rights." Id.
57. General Comment No. 17, supra note 2, 9.
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of the ICESCR.58 A review of all country reports submitted to the
CESCR since 2000 regarding compliance and implementation of
the Covenant reveals that the vast majority of reports have no
mention of trademarks, either in general or specifically with
reference to Article 15.59  When countries do mention the
development of trademark law as a part of their Article 15
compliance, it is vague and without connection to the substance of
the article itself. To the contrary, States Parties may assume some
connection of trademarks with Article 15, but this connection is
not borne out in the substance of the article in the country reports.
58. Id. 49.
59. To access individual state reports, see bayefsky.com, The United Nations Human
Rights Treaties: State Reports: CESCR, http://www.bayefsky.com/docs.php/area/reports/
node/2/treaty/cescr/opt/O (last visited Apr. 24, 2009). These reports can also be found on
United Nations Human Rights: Human Rights by Country, http://www.ohchr.org/
EN/Countries/Pages/HumanRightsintheWorld.aspx (last visited Apr. 24, 2009) (click on a
country; then follow ">Full list of documents in the Treaty Body Database" hyperlink;
follow "E" hyperlink beside document type "State Party Report"). To access 2008 state
reports, see Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Committee
on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, 41st Sess. (Nov. 3-21, 2008), http://www2.ohchr.org
english/bodies/cescr/cescrs41.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2009). Of the 75 countries that have
filed state reports to the CESCR since 2000, only 12 made any mention of steps taken to
improve the protection afforded to trademarks: Albania, Azerbaijan, China, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mexico,
Philippines, Republic of Moldova, and Tajikistan. Albania, 567, U.N. Doc. E/1990/5/Add.67
(Apr. 11, 2005); Azerbaijan, 418-22, U.N. Doc. E/1990/6/Add.37 (Dec. 1, 2003); China, TT
233, 256 U.N. Doc. E/1990/5/Add.59 (Mar. 4, 2004); Ecuador, 608, U.N. Doc.
E/1990/6/Add.36 (Dec. 20, 2002); El Salvador, T 920, U.N. Doc. E/1990/6/Add.39 (Feb. 23,
2005); Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 9 894, 918, 941, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/MKD/1
(Mar. 29, 2006); Madagascar, 669, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/MDG/2 (Aug. 22, 2008); Mauritius,
90, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/MUS/4 (Jan. 6, 2009); Mexico, 844, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/4/Add.16 (Feb.
25, 2005) (noting protection for "brand recognition"); Philippines, IT 1031-34, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/PHL/4 (Sept. 7, 2007); Republic of Moldova, 611, U.N. Doc. E/1990/5/Add.52 (Apr.
14, 2003); Tajikistan, 786, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/TJK/1 (May 31, 2006). Additionally, 24 of the
75 countries, roughly one-third, made no mention of steps taken to improve the property
protection afforded to any category of intellectual property. Algeria, U.N. Doc.
E/1990/6/Add.26 (July 28, 2000); Angola, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/AGO/3 (Apr. 28, 2008); Australia,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/AUS/4 (Jan. 7, 2008); Austria, U.N. Doc. E/1994/104/Add.28 (July 8, 2004);
Columbia, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/4/Add.6 (Aug. 31, 2000); Finland, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/FIN/5 (Feb.
8, 2006); France, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/FRA3 (Mar. 15, 2007); Iceland, U.N. Doc.
E/1994/104IAdd.25 (Oct. 19, 2001); Ireland, U.N. Doc. E/1990/6/Add.29 (Nov. 6, 2000);
Israel, U.N. Doc. E/1990/6/Add.32 (Oct. 16, 2001); Italy, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/4/Add.13 (May 21,
2003); Jamaica, U.N. Doc. E/1990/6/Add.28 (May 10, 2001); Kenya, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/KEN/1
(Sept. 11, 2007); Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, U.N. Doc. E/1990/6/Add.38 (Feb. 15, 2005);
Morocco, U.N. Doc. E/1994/104/Add.29 (Jan. 17, 2005); Paraguay, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/PRY/3
(Feb. 26, 2007); Republic of Serbia, U.N. Doc. E/1990/5/Add.61 (Nov. 26, 2003); Solomon
Islands, U.N. Doc. E/1990/5/Add.50 (July 30, 2001); Spain, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/4/Add.1l (Jan.
14, 2003); Ukraine, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/UKR]/5 (Aug. 14, 2006); United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, U.N. Doc. E/C.12IGBR/5 (Jan. 31, 2008); Uzbekistan, U.N.
Doc. E/1990/5/Add.63 (June 24, 2004); Yemen, U.N. Doc. E/1990/5/Add.54 (May 17, 2002).
III. TRADEMARKS
"And on the eighth day, God created trademarks."
The very first trademark appears as early as the Book of
Genesis, where it is written that God "set a mark upon Cain, lest
any finding him should kill him," for "therefore whosoever slayeth
Cain, vengeance shall be taken on him sevenfold."60 Trademarks
were used in the branding of cattle and animals in the Bible, as
well.61 Modern trademark law, however, can only be traced to the
fourteenth and the sixteenth centuries. 62 This time period heralded
a revival of learning and expansion of trade. Personal marks, such
as a family seal, a house mark, or a coat of arms, were used to
identify individuals.63 Proprietary marks were also used to identify
ownership of goods and often derived from a particular house
mark.64 The brands used for cattle were also often derived from a
particular house mark. 65 On a broader scale, as goods began to
flow to broader commercial markets, appellations of geographic
origin were used to identify tapestries and to signify a certain
quality. Watermarks began to be used in France in the thirteenth
century. 66 Trademark law was necessarily developed to address
breaches of custom: in the fourteenth century, Sydney Diamond
notes an innkeeper was hanged for passing off a low grade of wine
under a deceptive mark.67 Whether this is a testament to the
importance of a trademark or to the importance of decent wine is
left to the imagination of history.
Trademark law preceded copyright law, and thus trademark
rights were seen as more important than copyrights when it came
to printed works. In the early 1500s, there was no copyright, so
with the invention of the printing press, publishers and printers
competed for the most accurate version of a particular work. In
1512, a foreigner passed off a painting as one by the renowned
painter Albrecht Durer by putting the painter's initials, "AD," on
the work, and the foreigner was held liable for what we would
60. Genesis 4:15 (King James).
61. Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 TMR 265, 266-
88 (1975), reprinted in Robert P. Merges & Jane C. Ginsburg, Foundations of Intellectual
Property 444 (2004).
62. Id. at 272.
63. Id. at 273.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 274.
67. Id.at 279.
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think of today as trademark infringement. 68  Interestingly,
presumably the infringer could continue to copy the works of
Durer, just not sign them with Durer's initials. With an increase in
trade, authentication of goods became of vital importance: later in
the sixteenth century, for example, a law was passed that
punished infringers of Flemish tapestries by cutting off their right
hands.6
9
Because trademark infringement falls under the broader
rubric of consumer protection, trademark cases have historically
been classified as unfair competition cases. As early as 1871, the
U.S. Supreme Court stated that the function of a trademark is "to
point out distinctively the origin, or ownership of the article to
which it is affixed; or, in other words, to give notice who was the
producer." 70 Trademark law and unfair competition law both
prohibit conduct that is likely to confuse or deceive consumers as
to the source of goods and/or services. In Elgin National Watch Co.,
the Supreme Court emphasized that the foundation of trademark
law is consumer protection: "[T]he manufacturer of particular
goods is entitled to the reputation they have acquired, and the
public is entitled to the means of distinguishing between those,
and other, goods; and protection is accorded against unfair
dealing .... 71 In Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, the Supreme
Court further supported this view, stating, "The essence of the
wrong consists in the sale of the goods of one manufacturer or
vendor for those of another.... This essential element is the same
in trade-mark cases as in cases of unfair competition
unaccompanied with trade-mark infringement. In fact, the
common law of trade-marks is but a part of the broader law of
unfair competition."
72
A. Trademarks and Human Rights: This Bud's for You
In 2007, the European Court of Human Rights held that it had
jurisdiction over a trademark case through the property rights
68. Id.
69. Id. There is, however, no evidence that this sentence was ever carried out.
70. Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 322, 323 (1871) (noting that "[p]roperty in a trade-
mark ... has very little analogy to that which exists in copyrights, or in patents for
inventions," and that the misappropriation of a trademark may injure the trademark holder
and deceive the public "by inducing the public to purchase the goods and manufactures of
one person supposing them to be those of another").
71. Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665, 674 (1901).
72. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916). See id. at 414 ("[Ihe
trade-mark is treated as merely a protection for the good-will, and not the subject of
property except in connection with an existing business.").
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provision found in Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR.73 The
European Court began as a mechanism for judicial review of cases
falling under the ECHR, which came about as an outgrowth of the
Council of Europe after World War 11.74 The Council had been
given the task of drafting a human rights treaty, a task that met
with several stumbling blocks, including disagreement over the
inclusion of a right to property. 75 Some delegates were concerned
about references to compensation for the taking of property, which
they feared may compromise postwar economic and social
policies.76 In the end, the Convention was passed without a direct
provision for property rights, but with a commitment to continuing
negotiations. 77 The right to property was eventually included in
Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR.78 This right does not explicitly
include compensation guarantees, and instead declares that "[n]o
one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public
interest and subject to conditions provided for by law and by the
general principles of international law."
79
The Court has struggled to define the scope of the human right
to property found in Article 1 of Protocol 1 over the last few
decades. The provision protects individuals from interference with
the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions.80 The definition of
"possessions" has at times been one of contention, and the Court
has stated that the right applies only to existing property rights,
rather than rights to acquire property, or hopes of acquiring
property.8' However, "possessions," as interpreted by the Court,
73. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 830 (Grand Chamber 2007).
74. Laurence R. Heifer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights:
Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19
Euran. J. Int'l L. 125, 130 (2008).
75. Tom Allen, Compensation for Property Under the European Convention on Human
Rights, 28 Mich. J. Int'l L. 287, 291 (2007).
76. Id. (noting that the British government, for example, opposed the notion that every
taking of property requires compensation, as well as the idea that the international
community has an interest at all in a member state's substantive law on compensation).
77. Id.
78. Protocol 1, supra note 33, art. 1.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Heifer, supra note 33, at 8-9. "Possessions" may include future proprietary
interests; however, something more than an aspirational interest in property must exist. Id.
The European Court of Human Rights has held, for example, that future interests such as
vested social security and pension benefits, as well as options, can fall within the
parameters of proprietary protection. Id. Rights that are less tangible or are not vested, or
are conditional claims that lapse "as a result of the non-fulfillment of the condition," are not
protected, as they represent merely the "hope of recognition of a property right" rather than
a property right in itself which can be exercised effectively under the law. Id.
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can be "either 'existing possessions' or assets, including claims, in
respect of which the applicant ... has at least a 'legitimate
expectation' of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property right."82
Furthermore, the line between personal rights and property rights
is a fine one. The Court has affirmed that the concept of
"possessions" has an "autonomous meaning which is certainly not
limited to ownership of physical goods: certain other rights and
interests constituting assets can also be regarded as property
rights, and thus as 'possessions,' for the purposes [of the
Convention] ."83
While the property rights clause is contained in the document
as a first tier right, along with civil and political liberties, the
Court has interpreted the provision flexibly, giving governments a
wide berth when it comes to regulation of private property for
public use and welfare. 84 Within the last few years, the Court has
turned its sights to the subject of intellectual property, holding
that interests in intangible knowledge are protected as property
interests by Article 1.85 Relevantly, in a landmark judgment in
2007 in Anheuser-Busch v. Portugal, the Grand Chamber of the
European Court partially reversed an earlier decision of the lower
Chamber and clearly extended the protection of fundamental
property rights under Article 1 not simply to trademark
registrations but also to trademark registration applications. 86
Anheuser-Busch v. Portugal is merely the latest step in what
may be the most protracted litigation in intellectual property
history. In this particular case, Anheuser-Busch argued that
Portugal had violated its property rights under the ECHR by
denying Anheuser-Busch registration of its BUDWEISER mark
under a bilateral treaty that had entered into force six years after
it had applied to register the mark.87 In 1981, Anheuser-Busch
applied to register BUDWEISER as a trademark in Portugal;
however, the Portuguese National Institute for Industrial Property
did not grant the application, as the mark BUDWEISER BIER had
82. Id. at 8 (citing Kopeck' v. Slovakia, 2004-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 139-40).
83. Gasus Dosier- und Fordertechnik GmbH v. Netherlands, 306-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
A) at 46 (1995); see also Allen, supra note 75, at 308-09.
84. Heifer, supra note 33, at 2.
85. Id. at 3 (citing Dima v. Romania, App. No. 58472/00, para. 87 (2006) (admissibility
decision) (holding copyrighted works protected by Article 1 of the ECHR); Melnychuk v.
Ukraine, App. No. 28743/03, para. 8 (2005) (admissibility decision) (holding intellectual
property protected by Article 1 of ECHR); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No.
73049/01, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 42 [8461, 855-56 (Grand Chamber 2007) rev'g in part Second
Section, Chamber, judgment of Oct. 11, 2005 (registered trademarks protected by Article 1
of ECHR)).
86. Anheuser-Busch, supra note 85; see also Heifer, supra note 33, at 3.
87. Anheuser-Busch, supra note 85, at 830.
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previously been registered as a geographic designation of origin by
the Czech company Budejovicky Budvar. Anheuser-Busch sought
to cancel the registration of the geographic designation, which
petition was granted in 1995. Budejovicky Budvar appealed that
decision based upon a bilateral treaty (the "1986 Agreement")
between Portugal and then-Czechoslovakia that protected
geographic designations of origin. The 1986 Agreement entered
into force in 1987. The lower court refused to overturn the decision,
but the Court of Appeals reversed, and cancelled the BUDWEISER
mark belonging to Anheuser-Busch.
Anheuser-Busch then filed a petition with the European Court
of Human Rights, alleging a violation of its right to property under
Article 1. The lower Chamber held that Article 1 did not apply to
the dispute at hand, generally, and specifically, that Article 1
applies only "after final registration" of a trademark.88 On appeal,
the Grand Chamber partially reversed the lower Chamber's
decision, holding that both trademark registrations and trademark
registration applications are covered by Article l's right to
property.8 9 While it was undisputed in the European Court that
registered marks are property interests for purposes of Article 1,
the question to consider was whether trademark registration
applications constituted a "legitimate expectation" such that they
were "possessions."90 The Grand Chamber balanced the conditional
nature of a trademark registration application with the "bundle of
financial rights and interests that arise" upon its filing.91 In first-
to-file countries, such as the case at bar, these rights may include
entering into transactions such as licensing agreements, and,
particularly with regard to a famous mark such as the
BUDWEISER mark, those transactions may have "substantial
financial value."92 Thus, the Court concluded that the trademark
registration application came within the parameters of Article 1.
93
IV. THE FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHT
TO PROPERTY
The right of an individual to own property and not to be
deseized of it can be traced back to the beginnings of the human
rights discourse. As early as the thirteenth century, the right to
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property has been an integral part of legal instruments
propounding civil liberties. The Magna Carta, for example,
provided that "[n]o freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be
disseised of his freehold or liberties, or free customs or be outlawed
or exiled, or any otherwise damaged, nor will we pass upon him,
nor send upon him but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the
law of England."
94
Growing out of individualized efforts, a widespread and
recognized right to own property arose out of the natural law
movement in the seventeenth century. 95 During that time period,
rebellions in France, Spain, and England supported the rights of
people to resist absolutist governments. 96 These rebellions led to
internal movements supporting the rights of the individual against
governmental oppression. 97 A democratic movement in England
during that country's Civil War, for example, known as "The
Levellers," demanded constitutional reform and supported equal
rights; their name was coined by opponents who believed that their
agenda would have the effect of "leveling" society. 98 In 1649, the
Levellers published a manifesto for constitutional reform entitled
"Agreement of the People," which called for guaranteed natural
rights, including the right to property, as well as democratic
elections and freedom of religion.99
John Locke was perhaps the largest proponent of property
rights as human rights during that time period. A major pioneer of
natural rights philosophy, Locke argued that all individuals have
certain natural rights that exist outside of any organized society:
human beings are born in a "state of perfect equality, where
naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over
another."100 This equality, according to Locke, includes the rights
94. See Thomas Y. Davis, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now-Forgotten
Common-Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original Understanding of Due Process
of Law, 77 Miss. L.J. 1, 45 (citing 2 Sir Edward Coke, the Institutes of the Lawes of England
45-56).
95. Lauren, supra note 4, at 14.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. (citing A.S.P. Woodhousse, Puritanism and Liberty 444 (Dent & Sons 1938);
G.E. Aylmer, The Struggle for the Constitution 132-36 (Blandford 1975)).
99. Edward L. Rubin, Rethinking Human Rights, 9 Int'l Legal Theory 23-24 (2003)
(citing John Lilburne, The Young Men's and the Apprentices' Outcry, in Andrew Sharp, ed.,
The English Levellers 179, 182-83 (Cambridge University Press 1998); John Lilburne,
William Walwyn, Thomas Prince & Richard Overton, A Manifestation, in id. at 158, 160-61,
175-76; Richard Overton, An Arrow Against All Tyrants, in id. at 54, 55-57. See C.B.
Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke 137-42
(Oxford University Press 1962).
100. Lauren, supra note 4, at 15.
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of individuals to preserve their "property, including life, liberty,
and estate-against the injuries and attempts of other men."'101
The human right to property became further defined in legal
instruments throughout the eighteenth century. The French
Revolution resulted in the Declaration of Rights of Man and
Citizen. 10 2 Modeled in part after the United States Declaration of
Independence, the French Declaration asserted that all men "are
born and remain free and equal in rights," and established a wide
array of civil rights, including the right to possess property. 0 3 The
French Declaration was not unequivocally supported, however.
Long-acknowledged elements of difference served as a great
challenge to notions of equality and basic human rights.
04
Prejudice on the basis of race and gender persisted; male-
dominated societies were the norm, contributing to a perception of
women as being the weaker or lesser sex. 10 5 Racism as well was
supported by a long tradition of philosophers, scientists, and
geographers who asserted non-white inferiority. 0 6 This societal
order created a structure that was predictable and stable, and an
economy that flourished; defenders of tradition were concerned
that a loss of a sense of natural subordination would disrupt
society as a whole and "seriously threaten enviable conditions of
law and order and private property that had proven themselves
again and again over time and location throughout the world."'
0 7
Paul Gordon Lauren, in his book The Evolution of
International Human Rights, notes the double-edged sword that
exists in the language and vision of human rights generally and
101. Id.
102. Id. at 17-18.
103. Id. at 15 (citing Henri Chantavoine, Les principles de 1789; la D6claration des
droits, la Declaration des devoirs (Soci6t6 frangais d'imprimerie et de librairie 1906)).
104. Lauren, supra note 4, at 20-28.
105. Id. at 24.
106. Id. at 24-25. Such racially prejudicial notions can be found in the ideas expressed
by "Aristotle, historians such as Herodotus and Tacitus, geographers such as Solinus, and
chroniclers such as Gomes Eannes de Azurara." Id. The geographer Andr6 Thevet claimed
that black Africans were "stupid, bestial, and blinded by folly," and Jesuit missionary
Alexandre Valignamo declared that "all these dusky [non-European] races ... are very
stupid and vicious, and of the basest spirits." Id. (quoting Andr6 Thevet, Cosmographie
universelle 67 (Paris, Huilier 1575); Alexandre Valignamo, cited in C.R. Boxer, The
Portuguese Seaborne Empire 252 (Knopf 1969)). Furthermore, noted anthropologist Johann
Friedrich Blumenbach argued that "the white color holds the first place' while the others of
black, yellow, brown, and red skin color are merely degenerates from the original." Id.
(quoting Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, On the Natural Varieties of Mankind 209, 264, 269
(1775) (reprint, Bergman 1969).
107. Lauren supra note 4, at 26 (citing Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in
France 115, 344 (1790)).
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property rights specifically. 108 Over centuries, property rights had
become a foundational and intrinsic part of the language of human
rights discourse, encouraging people to consider them integral and
essential: "the most sacred of all the rights of citizenship," and
"even more important in some respects as liberty itself."'109 As a
result, it was not much of a leap to the place where these
arguments about property rights were used as "a defense for the
great holdings of the few rich against the poverty of the many
unpropertied poor, and to do so when definitions of private
property actually included living human beings: slaves, serfs, and
women."" 0 Thus, one individual's right to property could seriously
compromise another individual's right to self-determination.
The fundamental human right to own property, and not to be
arbitrarily deprived of it, is contained in the constitution of every
country in the Western Hemisphere,"' and is a standard provision
found in contemporary human rights instruments on a regional
and international scale as well. The UDHR provides for the right
of everyone to own property alone, as well as in association with
others, and for the right to be free from any arbitrary deprivation
of that property. 12 The right to property is found also in the
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen," 3 the
108. Lauren supra note 4, at 26 (noting Burke's fear of the destabilizing effects that
notions of human rights may have on the existing social order).
109. Lauren, supra note 4, at 26 (quoting Jean-Jacques Rousseau, A Discourse on
Political Economy, in The Social Contract and Discourses 311 (Dutton, 1950 ed.).
110. Lauren, supra note 4, at 26.
111. Thomas T. Ankersen & Thomas K. Ruppert, Defending the Polygon: The Emerging
Human Right to Communal Property, 59 Okla. L. Rev. 681, 733-34 (2006) (citing U.S. Const.
amend. V; Constitucion Argentina [Const. Arg.] art. 17; Constitucion de Belice de 1981
§ 3(d); Constitucion Politica de la Republica de Bolivia de 1967 art. 7; Constitui o Federal
[C.F.] art. 5, §§ 22-23 (Braz.); Constitucion Politica de la Republica de Chile de 1980 art. 19,
no. 24; Constitucion Politica de 1991 art. 58 (Colom.); Constitucion de 1985 con las Reformas
de 1993 art. 39 (Guat.); Constitucion Politica de 1982 arts. 61, 103, 105-06 (Hond.); Jamaica
(Constitution) Order in Council 1962 arts. 13, 18; Constitucion Politica de la Republica de
Nicaragua [Cn.] [Constitution] tit. I, art. 5, La Gaceta [L.G.] 9 Jan. 1987, amended by Ley
No. 192, 1 Feb. 1995, Reforma Parcial a la Constitucion Politica de la Republica de
Nicaragua, L.G., 4 July 1995; Constitucion Politica del Paraguay de 1992 art. 109;
Constitucion Politica del Peru de 1993 arts. 2, 70; Constitucion Politica de la Republica
Oriental del Uruguay de 1967 con las Modificaciones Hasta 1996 arts. 7, 32).
112. UDHR, supra note 3, art. 17 (declaring that "(1) [e]veryone has the right to own
property alone as well as in association with others" and "(2) [n]o one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his property").
113. Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, art. XVII,
http://oU.Hlibertyfund.orglindex.php?option=com-content&task--view&id=1347&Itemid=264#
doc09 (last visited Apr. 24, 2009) ("Property being an inviolable and sacred right, no one
may be deprived of it except when public necessity, certified by law, obviously requires it,
and on the condition of a just compensation in advance."). Article II provides that all
citizens are to be guaranteed rights of 'liberty, property, security, and resistance to
oppression." Id. art. II.
United States Bill of Rights, 14 and the African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights.
115
A. Property Rights Properly Defined:
It's My Bundle of Sticks!
The recalcitrance toward defining trademarks, and perhaps
intellectual property generally, as property often comes from a
misconception of property as the absolute dominion over some
thing. This concept of property arose in the early 1800s. 116 At that
time, property laws conceived of their subject matter as a physical
thing, to have and to hold, and the rights over that thing were
absolute." 7 Later in the nineteenth century, however, we began to
see a dephysicalization of property; courts began to protect
interests as property that did not fit into the physical definition, in
either or both respects. 18 Rather, any valuable interest could be
the subject matter of property, whether tangible or intangible in
form. In this spirit of discourse and change, Dean Acheson
remarked that the "all absorbing legal conception of the nineteenth
century was that of the property right."119 Courts no longer viewed
property rights as absolute, nor the subject matter of property as
necessarily a thing. Francis Swayze, addressing a graduating law
class at Yale in 1915, described "new kinds of property of great
114. U.S. Const. amend. V (providing that "[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation").
115. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 14, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter ACHPR]
('The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached upon in the interest
of public need or in the general interest of the community and in accordance with the
provisions of appropriate laws.").
116. For example, William Blackstone described property rights as "that sole and
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe." 2 William
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 2 (facsimile ed. 1979) (1765-69), cited in
Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 Yale L.J. 601, 601,
603-04 (1998).
117. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The
Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 Buff. L. Rev. 325, 328-30, 341-48 (1980)
(noting that during the early part of the nineteenth century, land was the primary source of
wealth, and, consequently, property interests were defined in absolutist terms in relation to
this physical thing).
118. Id. As industry supplanted land as the dominant source of wealth in the latter half
of the nineteenth century, the Blackstonian conception of property as absolutist and
physicalist became anachronistic. Consequently, courts began to recognize an expanded
notion of property that had shifted away from its agrarian root in physical things toward
the recognition of rights in incorporeal things, such as business interests. Id.
119. Id. (quoting Dean Acheson, Book Review, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 329, 330 (1919)).
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value," including, in point of fact, business goodwill, trademarks,
and trade secrets. 1
20
Within this reconceptualization of what a property interest is,
courts had then to decide what would qualify as property per se,
and how much protection a given piece-or form--of property
should get. Hohfeld encapsulates the modern approach to property
rights as "a set of legal relations between people."'121 In 1913, he
outlined eight fundamental legal relations that formed the basis
for property: To own property is to have rights, privileges, powers,
and immunities; to not own property meant no rights, duties,
disabilities, or liabilities. 122 Similarly, in 1936 the American Law
Institute Restatement of Property defined four constituent
elements of property: rights, privileges, powers, and immunities,
with the negative corollaries. 23
If property can be defined as any valuable interest, however, it
fails categorically to have material significance; that is, it does not
serve to distinguish one set of legal relations from another. The
greater the variety of interests that are protected as property, the
more difficult it is to assert that all forms of property should be
protected to the same degree, and, at some point on the spectrum,
the category of "property" becomes meaningless. Yet property
rights, as Posner notes, are essential: "The creation of individual
... ownership rights is a necessary rather than a sufficient
condition for the efficient use of resources."'124 Justice Holmes, in
his dissent in INS v. AP, voiced this concern:
Property, a creation of law, does not arise from value,
although exchangeable-a matter of fact. Many exchangeable
120. Vandevelde, supra note 117 (citing Francis J. Swayze, The Growing Law, 25 Yale
L.J. 1, 10 (1915)).
121. Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 16 (1913).
122. Id. at 30. Although the term "right" is often used indiscriminately to convey a broad
array of notions, including "property, interest, power, prerogative, immunity, privilege," the
term is better understood in relation to its correlative, "duty," or obligation. Id. at 30-31.
Thus, for every right, some other person, persons, or society generally has a correlative (and
equal) duty. Id. "[A] privilege is the opposite of a duty and the correlative of a 'no-right."' Id.
at 32. "[A] legal power ... is the opposite of a legal disability and the correlative of legal
liability." Id. at 44. And, "immunity is the correlative of disability ('no-power), and the
opposite, or negation, of liability." Id. at 55.
123. Restatement (First) of Prop. § 5 (1936) (defining a property "interest" as an
aggregate of "rights, privileges, powers and immunities"); id. § 5 cmt. a. (noting that "[t]here
is no corresponding term in common use which includes generically duties, lack of rights,
liabilities, and disabilities").
124. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 33 (7th ed. 2007).
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values may be destroyed intentionally without compensation.
Property depends upon exclusion by law from interference.
125
Justice Brandeis, also dissenting, added, "[T]he fact that a product
of the mind has cost its producer money and labor, and has a value
for which others are willing to pay, is not sufficient to insure to it
this legal attribute of property."
126
The modern conception of property, which will likely ring
familiar to anyone who has taken property courses at a law school
in the United States, is as a bundle of sticks. 127 While the subject
matter of property can be anything of value, property is defined as
a bundle of rights-metaphorically speaking, sticks-not all of
which one needs to have to create a property interest, and all of
which come in varying strengths and forms. These rights are more
specific than the broad "rights, privileges, powers, and immunities"
criteria; they can include, inter alia, the right to exclude, use,
possess, transfer, and/or destroy. Felix Cohen described private
property as not necessarily comprehensive of the bundle of rights,
but rather as "a relationship among human beings such that the
so-called owner can exclude others from certain activities or permit
others to engage in those activities and in either case secure the
assistance of the law in carrying out his decision."1 28 Furthermore,
individual rights, or sticks in the bundle, may exist but be
extremely limited. An easement, for example, is clearly a property
interest, and yet it may be limited for one purpose, such as utility
lines, over one section (of one corner) (of a piece) of land.129 A right
of way to access a beach is another example of a real property
interest that is extremely limited but yet is clearly a property
125. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
126. Id. at 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
127. According to Schorr, the "bundle of rights" concept of property is most often
attributed to Hohfeld. David B. Schorr, How Blackstone Became a Blackstonian, 10
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 103 n.2 (2009) (citing Hohfeld, supra note 122; Wesley N.
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 Yale L.J. 710
(1917); see also A.M. Honor6, Ownership, in Oxford Essays In Jurisprudence 107 (A.D.
Guest ed., 1961)).
128. Felix Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 Rutgers L. Rev. 357, 373 (1954),
reprinted in Richard H. Chused, A Property Anthology 97 (2d ed. 1997).
129. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). The U.S.
Supreme Court held in Loretto that a state law preventing a landlord from interfering with
the installation of cable television facilities on his property constituted a taking for which
just compensation was due, as required under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution. Id. at 422, 441. Despite the cable's diminutive size, a mere one-half inch in
diameter and 30 feet in length, the Court concluded that the statute's grant of the
permanent physical occupation of the landlord's property effectively appropriated the
landlord's rights to possess, use, and dispose of the property. Id. at 435-36.
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interest. 130 A property interest may involve the right to use, but
only for a specific purpose and in a specific way; it may also involve
the right to transfer, or to possess, but, then, it may not.
Property rights develop to internalize externalities when the
gains of internalization become larger than the cost of
internalization. 131 Property rights emerge with new or different
harmful or beneficial effects, including new techniques, new ways
of doing the same things, and doing new things. Thus, ways of
conceptualizing property itself become important when there are
new forms of property, or the application of established forms of
property to distinct contexts, for not only is the right to property a
fundamental human right, but also the "legal protection of
property rights creates incentives to use resources efficiently."'
132
V. TRADEMARKS ARE ABSOLUTELY
PROPERTY RIGHTS
(BUT PROPERTY RIGHTS ARE NOT ABSOLUTE)
A. Long-Standing Controversy
The controversy over whether trademark rights are or are not
property rights is a long-standing one. At times it has been as
colorful a dispute as that of the Hatfields and the McCoys.
However, this debate is at base one of form over substance, akin to
seeing a glass as half full or half empty. Early cases throughout
the nineteenth century propounded the characterization of
130. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984). In
Matthews, the New Jersey Supreme Court extended the public's access to beaches under the
"public trust doctrine," whereby the public has traditionally enjoyed access to beach areas
touched by the tide, by requiring private landowners with land abutting coastal areas to
allow not only the public's use of private coastal lands but also its access to them. Id. at 360,
364.
131. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347
(Pap. & Proc. 1967), reprinted in Robert C. Ellickson et al., Perspectives on Property Law
135 (3d ed. 2002). Historically, according to Demsetz, societies have adopted increased and
more elaborate systems of private property in response to changes in technology and
consequent changes in the relative prices of goods. Taking Demsetz's analysis a step
further, it would seem that improved modes of transportation open up new markets,
altering relative commodity prices as greater demand is realized. This increased demand
sparks improvements in the methods of acquisition, such as hunting and farming
implements. In the absence of property rights, these technological improvements lead
invariably to overuse, and consequent social turmoil as members of society seek to
appropriate as much of a good made newly valuable as they can. To ameliorate this threat
to social cohesion and stability, societies begin to demarcate rights to property in an effort to
direct the behavior of individuals toward socially useful ends.
132. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 32-33 (4th ed. 1992).
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trademarks as property. In Millington v. Fox,133 for example, a
defendant was found to have infringed a mark without intent or
knowledge, but an injunction was issued. Using the reasoning in
Millington, a later court acknowledged that a cause of action for
deceit or fraud would lie at law, but instead the court chose to
grant an injunction in equity, acting "on the principle of protecting
property alone."'134 The theory of trademarks as property rights
gained a following by courts throughout the nineteenth century,
with courts of equity applying basic property principles time and
again to trademark rights. 135 Courts reasoned that "the same
things are necessary to constitute a title to relief in equity in the
case of the infringement of a right to a trade-mark as in the case of
a violation of any other right of property." 136 Finally, in 1882, Lord
Blackburn proclaimed with some sense of finality that it was well
settled that "both trade-marks and trade names are in a certain
sense property."'
137
Judicial opinions during this time period were not uniform in
their characterization of trademarks as property, however. There
was a line of cases contemporaneous with those above, in fact, that
held precisely the opposite view. In 1896, for example, the House of
Lords held directly that there was no property right in a
trademark, despite the fact that "some of the rights incident to
property might attach thereto."' 38 Almost forty years earlier, in
133. 3 Myl. & C. 338 (Ch. 1838). Prior to Millington, courts provided trademark
protection through an action for deceit. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of
Trademark Protection, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 813-14, 816, 817, 818-22, 825, 830-31 (1927),
reprinted in Merges & Ginsburg, supra note 61, at 462. Thus considered, trademark
protection came in the form of a negative right or duty to refrain from deceiving the public.
In Millington, however, a court of equity expanded this notion, inferring a legal right to
possess a trademark and issued the first ever injunction to protect a trademark. Id.
134. Edelsten v. Edelsten, 1 De G. J. & S. 185, 199 (1863). Boylan suggests that later
courts interpreted the Millington court's rationale and the Edelsten court's elimination of
the element of intent from a finding of fraud in trademark infringement actions as an
endorsement of a conception of trademark protection rooted in property law. Kristine M.
Boylan, The Corporate Right of Publicity in Federal Dilution Legislation, 82 J. Pat. &
Trademark Off. Soc'y 5, 7 (2000).
135. See Rudolf Callmann, Unfair Competition Without Competition, 95 U. Pa. L. Rev.
443, 454-56 (1983). Callman notes that property rights have never been absolute. Id. at 465.
To the extent that trademark rights are limited, this affects "not the nature but only the
scope of protection .... In this respect, trademark property does not differ from other
property which is subject to general limitations." Id.
136. Id. at 455 (citing Singer Mfg. Co. v. Loog, 8 App. Cas. 15, 33 (1882)).
137. Callmann, supra note 135, at 455 (citing Hall v. Barrows, 4 De. G.J. & S. 150, 32 L.
J. Ch. 548 (1863)).
138. Reddaway v. Banham, A.C. 199, 209 (1896). In Reddaway, Lord Herschell declared
that the proper inquiry in trademark appropriations cases is not whether the defendant has
infringed upon some legal right in the trademark but rather whether the facts proved that
the defendant intended to mislead the public when it used the trademarked word or words.
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what appears in retrospect to be a bit aspirational in nature, the
court in Collins Co. v. Brown proclaimed that it was "now settled
that there is no property whatever in a trade-mark."'
139
As it is apparently well settled that trademark rights both are
and are not property rights, it is worthwhile to look a bit deeper
into the analysis. The concept of trademarks as property rights
does not conflict with the traditional justification for trademark
rights as consumer protection devices designed to prevent
deception as to source of goods. The notion of trademark rights as
property rights first appeared in United States jurisprudence
during the second half of the nineteenth century. In The Trade-
Mark Cases, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the right to adopt
and use a symbol or device to identify one's goods and services and
to distinguish them from those of others is a right long recognized
at common law, and that a trademark right "is a property right for
the violation of which" either damages or an injunction may be
sought. 140 The beginning of the twentieth century, however, saw a
narrowing of perception when it came to trademarks and property
rights, and courts began to qualify their statements on the issue.
Thus, for example, the Supreme Court held in 1917 that "the word
property as applied to trade-marks and trade secrets is an
unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of the
Id. at 209-10. The plaintiff had for a number of years stamped the words "camel hair
belting" onto its belts. Some ten years after the plaintiff had begun this practice, the
defendant, a former employee of the plaintiffs, began stamping the same words on his belts.
The court upheld the jury's verdict for the plaintiff, finding that although the defendant's
products were "belts" and were made with "camel hair," products in that trade had never
before been advertised as being composed of camel hair; rather, that usage had only been
employed by the plaintiff to refer to his particular belts. Id. at 212-13. As such, the jury was
justified in attaching liability to the defendant, not because he used the trademarked words
but because he did so in order to deceive members of the public, who would have purchased
the defendant's belts believing them to be those of the plaintiff. Id. at 215.
139. Collins Co. v. Brown, 3 K. & J. 423, 426 (1857) (holding that while "there is no
property whatever in a trademark ... a person may acquire a right of using a particular
mark for articles which he has manufactured, so that he may be able to prevent any other
person from using it, because the mark denotes that articles so marked were manufactured
by a particular person").
140. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879). In this case, the Court struck down
a federal trademark statute as unconstitutional, finding that trademarks do not meet the
constitutional requirements that they be original "writings" and that their possessor be an
"author" to receive protection. The Court noted, however, that trademark protection "has
long been recognized by the common law and the chancery courts of England and of this
country, and by the statutes of some of the States." Id. This right was not created by
Congress nor does it depend on Congress; rather, it anteceded the federal statute. Id.
Consequently, relief for trademark infringement may be obtained only under state law. Id.
The Court noted, however, that Congress could create a system of federal trademark
protection under the authority it derives from the Commerce Clause. Id.
primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary requirements
of good faith."'
141
Widmaier objects to what he calls "the propertization of
trademarks."'142 He states that trademarks are distinct from
property rights insofar as they serve as a commercial signifier. In
1942, Justice Frankfurter summarized the foundation of
trademark law, describing the power of a trademark as being its
"commercial magnetism":
The protection of trademarks is the law's recognition of the
psychological function of symbols. If it is true that we live by
symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by them. A
trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a
purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to
believe he wants.... If another poaches upon the commercial
magnetism of the symbol he has created, the [trademark]
owner can obtain legal redress.
143
Throughout the twentieth century, trademark rights became
generally viewed as "qualified" property rights. The first
explication of a particular (and attenuated) property interest in
trademarks was provided in Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf:
Common-law trademarks, and the right to their exclusive use,
are, of course, to be classed among property rights... but only
in the sense that a man's right to the continued enjoyment of
his trade reputation and the good will that flows from it, free
from unwarranted interference by others, is a property right,
for the protection of which a trademark is an
instrumentality. 1
44
141. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917).
142. Uli Widmaier, Use, Liability, and the Structure of Trademark Law, 33 Hofstra L.
Rev. 603, 615 (2004). Widmaier contends that '"U.S. trademark law does not create true
property rights," basing this assertion on the fact that rights in trademarks are contingent
on the trademarks' continued use and consumers' belief that the trademark indicates a
source. Id. at 610-11.
143. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942),
cited in Widmaier, supra note 142, at 613-14.
144. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916). In Hanover, the
Court denied relief to a flour manufacturer for trademark infringement, concluding that
because the defendant's flour did not reach the plaintiffs market and the plaintiff did not
market or advertise its flour in the defendant's market, the defendant's use of the mark
could not have misled any of the potential buyers in the plaintiffs market. Id. at 411-12.
The right to the exclusive use of a trademark "extends only to those markets where the
trader's goods have become known and identified by his use of the mark." Id. at 412.
Trademark rights exist to protect the goodwill of the holder's trade or business, and,
because the defendant could not have interfered with or harmed the plaintiffs reputation or
good will, no infringement had occurred for which relief would be granted. Id. at 413.
919Vol. 99 TMR
920 Vol. 99 TMR
This characterization of trademarks as a kind of attenuated
property interest became the norm. Courts emphasized time and
again that there were no rights in a trademark beyond those rights
associated with a source-indicating function, that a trademark was
itself inseparable from the goodwill it represented, and that it had
no existence unconnected with that use.145 In United Drug Co. v.
Theodore Rectanus Co., the U.S. Supreme Court summarized,
"There is no such thing as property in a trademark except as a
right appurtenant to an established business or trade in
connection with which the mark is employed."'
146
In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board, the U.S. Supreme Court distinguished
the constitutionally protected property interest of trademarks from
other rights falling under the U.S. Trademark (Lanham) Act. 147 In
that case, the Court held that neither the right to be free from a
competitor's false advertising nor a more generalized right to be
secure in one's business interests is a property right protected
under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. 48
Rather, the Court reasoned, "The hallmark of a protected property
interest is the right to exclude others[, which is] 'one of the most
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property."' 49 Citing its earlier opinion in K Mart
Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,150 the Court included trademark rights
within the parameters of that protected property interest:
145. See, e.g., United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918); Am.
Photographic Publ'g Co. v. Ziff-Davis Publ'g Co., 135 F.2d 569, 572 (1943) (stating that
"[a]lthough trade-mark rights are property, they are not protected per se;" protection
extends only to the "good will in connection with which the mark is used").
146. United Drug Co., 248 U.S. at 97.
147. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673
(1999).
148. Id. at 673-75. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides that no
State shall "deprive any person of... property ... without due process of law." U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1.
149. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 673.
150. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1988). The Court stated that
trademark law accords trademark holders the right to exclude and "the right to enlist the
Customs Service's aid to bar foreign-made goods bearing that trademark." Id. (citing 71
Cong. Rec. 3871 (1929) (remarks of Sen. George) (Section 526(a) [the trademark statute]
"undoubtedly had its origin not in an effort to exclude merchandise bearing a trade-mark,
but for the purpose of protecting the interest of the owner of the trade-mark who had gone
to the trouble of registering it"); 62 Cong. Rec. 11603 (1922) (remarks of Sen. Sutherland)
(Section 526(a) is designed to "protec[t] the property rights of American citizens who have
purchased trade-marks from foreigners")). Additionally, the sole discretion to determine
what, if any, products will enter and who may import them is vested in the trademark
holder, as is the discretion to stipulate any necessary conditions on the importation or
satisfactory purpose. K Mart Corp., 485 U.S. at 186.
Trademark law, like contract law, confers private rights,
which are themselves rights of exclusion. It grants the
trademark owner a bundle of such rights.1
51
Because trademark rights contain a right to exclude, and the
false advertising provisions of the Lanham Act do not, the Court
reasoned that trademark rights are properly characterized as
property interests, and the false advertising claims are not.
152
Furthermore, while business assets are clearly property interests,
the act of doing business or making a profit is not.
153
B. The Debate Over the "Propertization" of
Trademarks Is Mischaracterized
Categorizing trademarks as "attenuated" property interests, or
"qualified" property interests, misses the mark, because it fails to
consider the reality of property rights. Property rights, by their
nature, are more often than not both attenuated and qualified. Of
course trademarks perform a source-identifying function, but that
does not make a trademark right any less of a property right.
Property rights are not rights in gross, nor are they absolute.
54
Rather, they are nearly always limited in nature. To claim that a
trademark right is any less of a property interest because it is
associated with business goodwill would be like saying a tenancy
in a leasehold estate is less of a property interest because it is
characterized in certain limited ways, or that an easement is less
of a property interest because it is beholden to a servient estate, or,
for that matter, that a future springing executory interest is less of
a property right because it does not actually (and may never)
involve the right of present possession. 15 5 Furthermore, property
151. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 673 (quoting K Mart Corp., 485 U.S. at 185-86).
152. Id. ('The Lanham Act's false-advertising provisions ... bear no relationship to any
right to exclude; and Florida Prepaid's alleged misrepresentations concerning its own
products intruded upon no interest over which petitioner had exclusive dominion.").
153. Id. at 675. But see id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("the activity of doing business, or
the activity of making a profit. .. is a form of property").
154. Rose notes that Blackstone must have been and was clearly aware of qualifications
to his description of property in terms of total exclusion and despotic dominion, as he
himself discussed specific limitations, including neighborly responsibilities and duties in
relation to riparian and nuisance law, claims by the destitute to subsistence from the more
prosperous, and family obligations created by fee tails. Rose, supra note 116, at 601, 603-04.
155. Widmaier contends that U.S. trademark law does not accord true property rights to
trademark owners, as rights in a trademark are contingent on the mark's continued use and
consumers' belief that it indicates a source. Widmaier, supra note 142, at 610-11. This
stipulation, however, that property rights in a trademark exist so long as it is continually
used and consumers believe that it indicates a source closely parallels the language used to
create a determinable fee, "to A so long as land is used for X," yet no one would deny that a
determinable fee is a property interest.
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rights are not necessarily static over time; as water rights evolve
depending upon what (and how much) water is in a given place at
a given time, trademark rights ebb and flow pursuant to the minds
of consumers. There are many sticks in the bundle, and trademark
rights enjoy a multitude of them: the right to use; the right to
alienate; the right to possess; the right to exclude. Furthermore,
these rights are not absolute in either trademark law or real
property law.
A parallel to trademarks can be found in the real property
interest of the determinable fee. A fee simple determinable is an
interest that is conditioned by durational language and a certain
event. A determinable fee may last forever, but it may terminate if
the property is not used in a certain way-that is, upon the
happening or non-happening of a specified event, at which point
the property interest automatically terminates. An example of a
determinable fee is when an owner conveys an interest "to A and
his heirs so long as his chocolate remains in peanut butter, and if
his chocolate is no longer in peanut butter, then to B." In that
situation, A has a fee simple determinable, which is conditioned
upon a particular use of the property. If A ceases to use it in the
prescribed manner, unconnected with the conditioned use, the
property interest terminates. The determinable fee is similar to a
trademark, which is also a property interest that has conditions
upon its use. Should the trademark owner allow the mark to be
used in other ways, the property interest terminates. Such
conditions do not preclude, nor do they affect, classification of a
trademark as a property interest.
The current debate over the propertization of trademarks is
mischaracterized. While it is undisputed that the strength of
trademark rights has grown significantly in recent years,
symbolized in large part by the development of dilution as a
broadened form of trademark infringement, 156 that strengthening
does not make a trademark any more of a property right than it
was. By contrast, tenants' rights have grown significantly since the
widespread adoption of the Warranty of Habitability, 157 for
example, but this strengthening of rights is not, and should not be,
characterized as the propertization of tenancies. Whether
trademark rights are too expansive is a worthwhile and interesting
156. Under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, subject to equitable principles
to the contrary, an owner of a famous trademark may seek an injunction against any entity
that uses the mark in commerce after the mark has become famous if this use is likely to
tarnish or diminish its value, even if the new use is not in competition with the prior use, is
not likely to cause confusion, and does not cause any actual injury. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1)
(West 2006).
157. See, e.g., Hilder v. Peter, 478 A.2d 202 (Vt. 1984) (incorporating the warranty of
habitability into Vermont leasehold law).
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subject for debate, but it is not correlative with a debate over
whether trademark rights are property interests per se. To argue
that trademark rights are too expansive is not to argue that they
should not be a property right.
Commentators who rise up against the "propertization" of
trademarks 158  usually cite the absolute nature of property
rights,.159 but, as discussed above, this is a clear misunderstanding
of property law generally. Blackstone's characterization of
property, "that sole and despotic dominion conferring total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe,"160 is
far from an accurate description of modern property law. Lemley
notes that laypeople, lawyers, and judges might describe property
rights "along the lines of 'you own it, so you can do what you want
with it."'161 However, this description would not be unique to real
property. Certainly, intellectual property owners often have the
same perception of their rights,1 62 an assumption of which many
intellectual property lawyers have had to disabuse their clients. In
the case of both real and intellectual property, the property owners
would be mistaken. The misperception of laypeople over what it
means to have a property right is not evidence of the unqualified
nature of property rights, but it may be evidence of why people are
afraid of them. In any event, the characterization of property
rights as absolute is an inaccurate statement of what property
rights-or intellectual property rights, for that matter-are under
the law.
158. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 Tex.
L. Rev. 1031 (2005). Lemley argues that the fear of free riding, which has traditionally
served as the primary economic justification for treating intellectual property as property, is
unjustified as it applies to intellectual property and a tragedy of the commons would not
result if intellectual property were denied the property protection it currently receives. Id.
at 1047-55. Additionally, while incentives may be necessary for the types of works covered
by copyrights and patents, the need to create incentives does not apply to trademarks. Id. at
1058 (noting that William Kratzke made the similar point that the free riding argument in
defense of intellectual property protection for trademarks derives from "conclusionary
epithets rather than workable economic principles." William P. Kratzke, Normative
Economic Analysis of Trademark Law, 21 Memphis St. U. L. Rev. 199, 223 (1991)). Lemley
also argues that the propertization of intellectual property leads to the overcompensation of
creators, as the additional rights accorded create inefficiencies by "distort[ing] markets
away from the competitive norm," interfere with the rights of others to create, encourage
wasteful rent-seeking behavior, entail administrative costs, and encourage overinvestment
in creation. Lemley, supra, at 1058. See also Widmaier, supra note 142, at 610. See also
Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in the
Information Age, 66 L. & Contemp. Probs. 89, 90 (2003).
159. See, e.g., Widmaier, supra note 142, at 610-11.
160. Blackstone, supra note 116.
161. Lemley, supra note 158, at 1037.
162. I will pause for a moment while we all think of personal client examples in our
minds.
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Lemley describes the "tragedy of the commons," which is often
provided as a justification for property rights generally. 163 The
tragedy of the commons occurs when the value of a particular
piece of property is depleted by overuse. 64 It is perhaps best
illustrated by the example of a fishing pond, or a college
dorm's common areas. In a fishing pond, if there are no
property rights, everyone will benefit from fishing as much as
possible, and, in the end, the fishing pond will be depleted of
fish. In the commons area of a college dorm, without some
kind of rights or responsibility, everyone will leave their beer
cans and pizza boxes lying about, and will fail to take care of
the space, until the space is substantially reduced in value.
Lemley posits that, unlike the case with real property, "there
is no tragedy of the commons in intellectual property."'165 As
support for this assertion, Lemley interchanges the concept of
intellectual property rights with information; he claims that
the consumption of information is nonrivalrous, and that "my
use of an idea does not impose any direct cost on you."'166 He
argues that "precisely because its consumption is
nonrivalrous, information does not present any risk of the
tragedy of the commons." 167 "It simply cannot be 'used up.""168
However, the concept of "information" is materially distinct
from the concept of intellectual property rights, and while a
different argument might be made with regard to copyrights or
patent rights, this reasoning falls flat when applied to trademark
rights. When it comes to trademark rights, what we are concerned
about is not information itself: of course information can be
163. Id. at 50. See also Demsetz, supra note 131.
164. Id.
165. Lemley, supra note 158, at 1050-51.
166. Id.
167. Id. (citing James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of
the Public Domain, 66 L. & Contemp. Probs. 33, 41 (2003) ("[A] gene sequence, an MP3 file,
or an image may be used by multiple parties; my use does not interfere with yours."); Rose,
supra note 158, at 90 ("In Intellectual Space, [the tragedy of the commons argument] falls
away, since there is no physical resource to be ruined by overuse.")). Rather, Lemley argues
that the opposite occurs-a "comedy of the commons" results whereby everyone benefits.
Lemley, supra note 158, at 1050-51 (citing David Bollier, Silent Theft: Private Plunder of
Our Common Wealth 37 (2002); Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of
Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 129 (1998);
Benjamin G. Damstedt, Note, Limiting Locke: A Natural Law Justification for the Fair Use
Doctrine, 112 Yale L.J. 1179, 1182-83 (2003) ("suggesting that it is waste by underuse
rather than depletion by overuse with which intellectual property theorists should be
concerned")). Lemley argues that the use of protected ideas or words is not the type of use
with which property theory has traditionally been concerned, as this use does no harm to
the original creator. Lemley, supra note 158, at 1052.
168. Lemley, supra note 158, at 1051.
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repeated and reproduced. What we are concerned about, quite to
the contrary, is the rights themselves, which, even more than a
dorm room or a fishing pond, present in the case of trademarks
what one might consider the ultimate tragedy of the commons.
The rights that a trademark holder has involve exclusive use
of a mark as a source-identifier on certain goods and services. The
very rights accorded a trademark owner depend, in fact, on that
owner's ability to police the mark. To the extent of his rights, the
trademark owner is responsible for protecting that mark from
being used by others to identify their goods and services. If a
trademark owner allows others to use his mark on the same goods
and services, the very rights themselves will disappear. While
information itself may be nonrivalrous, trademark rights are, by
definition, rivalrous. To the extent that a trademark rightsholder
allows the public to fish in his pond, or to leave beer cans in his
dorm room's common area, the pond and the common area may
disappear entirely. That is, he may end up with no trademark at
all.
Trademarks are de facto treated as property interests. To the
extent of the right, a trademark can be used, sold, abandoned, or
licensed. Trademarks are recognized as assets in bankruptcy
proceedings. 169 Since 2001, the Financial Accounting Standards
Board has issued regulations requiring that an acquiring entity in
a bankruptcy perform a detailed purchase price allocation that
segregates values attributable to trademarks in an effort to
address the problem of undervaluing of intellectual property
assets.170 Trademarks can even be seized as part of a criminal
forfeiture in a governmental raid.17' In October 2008, the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) indicted members of the Mongols
gang on racketeering charges. 72 As part of the indictment, the
169. Adams Apple Distrib. Co. v. Papeleras Reunidas, S.A., 773 F.2d 925 (7th Cir. 1985).
The Seventh Circuit held in Adams that a lien could be placed on a trademark in a
bankruptcy proceeding. Id. Noting that a trademark is not a property interest in gross that
may be sold apart from its associated business or goodwill, the court stated that imposing
an equitable lien on the trademark would not give the lienholder an in gross right to the
trademark itself. Id. Rather, the lienholder would obtain a security interest on the property.
Id.
170. See Fernando Torres, Trademark Values in Corporate Restructuring, presented at
Western Economics Association International (July 1, 2007), http:/ssrn.com/abstract=
1014741 (last visited Apr. 24, 2009).
171. Any person found guilty of racketeering under Title 18, Section 1962 of the U.S.
Code may be ordered to forfeit any of his property, including real property, tangible and
intangible personal property, and any "rights, privileges, interests, claims, and securities"
he may derive from any personal property. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(b) (West 2006).
172. Press Release from Thom Mrozek, Public Affairs Officer, United States Attorney's
Office for the Central District of California, U.S. Department of Justice, ATF Undercover
Investigation Leads to Federal Racketeering Indictment and Arrest of 61 Members of So.
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DOJ sought forfeiture of the MONGOLS trademark 173 as part of
the gang's assets. An attorney for the DOJ stated that the seizure
of the gang's trademark was an attempt to strip the gang of its
"very identity."174 In an order by the U.S. District Court, the judge
acknowledged that the trademark was subject to possible
forfeiture:
Count eighty-five of the indictment alleges the Mongols
trademark as an asset which the government seeks to forfeit
in these criminal proceedings. The indictment alleges that the
defendants control the Mongols Motorcycle club, also known
as Mongol Nation, which in turn owns the trademark, and
that in the event of the defendants' convictions, the trademark
would be subject to forfeiture to the United States under 18
U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1), (2) and (3).175
This was not the first time that the United States government
had sought seizure of trademark assets. The government seized
the famous Las Vegas brothel Mustang Ranch in 1999 after
obtaining guilty verdicts against its parent companies and
manager in a federal fraud and racketeering trial.176 As part of its
assets, the government seized the MUSTANG RANCH
trademark. 177 The government later sold the buildings on the eBay
Internet auction site for $145,000 to an individual, who moved the
buildings and reopened the business. 178 The original proprietor of
the Mustang Ranch argued that the new owner should be unable
to use the trademark MUSTANG RANCH because the assignment
Cal.-Based Mongols Outlaw Motorcycle Gang, No. 08-142 (Oct. 12, 2008),
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/cac/pressroom/pr2008/142.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2009). "The
Mongols have been in an escalating battle with the Hells Angels motorcycle gang since 2002
when the two groups engaged in a massive riot at a casino in Laughlin, Nevada. The
Mongols have also been involved in an ongoing and violent feud with the Mexican Mafia
over Mongols drug trafficking activities in areas controlled by the Mexican Mafia." Id.
173. U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 2916965 (registered Jan. 11, 2005), http://tarr.uspto.gov/
servlet/tarr?regser=serial&entry76532713 (last visited Apr. 24, 2009) (USPTO record for
MONGOLS trademark).
174. Scott Glover, Raid Targets Mongols Motorcycle Gang, L.A. Times, Oct. 22, 2008,
http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-mongols22-2008oct22,0,5451131,full.story (last
visited Apr. 24, 2009).
175. Amended Order Restraining Trademark at 2, United States v. Cavazos, No. CR 08-
1201 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2008), http://extras.mnginteractive.com/live/media/site205/2008/
1022/20081022_061031_SU22-MONGOLS%20order.pdf.
176. Martin Griffith, Judge: Mustang Ranch Brothel Keeps Name, Wash. Post, Dec. 16,
2006, http://www.washingtonpost.comwp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/16/ AR2006121601138.
html (last visited Apr. 24, 2009); Burgess v. Gilman, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1053-54 (D. Nev.
2007).
177. Griffith, supra note 176; Burgess, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 1057.
178. Griffith, supra note 176; Burgess, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 1059.
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was made in gross and was not made in connection with the
goodwill of the business. Finally, in September 2008, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the U.S.
Bureau of Land Management had indeed owned the trademark as
part of the assets of Mustang Ranch, and that the assignment of
the trademark did not have to be in connection with tangible
property-that the asset of the trademark alone, in connection
with the goodwill of the business, was enough to overcome
allegations of its being an assignment in gross.
179
VI. TRADEMARKS ARE NOT HUMAN RIGHTS,
BUT PROPERTY RIGHTS WITH
HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS
Trademark rights are not human rights per se, any more than
is the computer on which I typed this article or the chair upon
which I sat. The provisions found in international and regional
human rights instruments commonly cited as the intellectual
property provisions clearly reference both the subjects of, and the
rights implicated by, copyrights and patents, but they do not, in
contrast to common misconception, include trademark rights.
Trademarks are not literary or scientific works, and do not
implicate the moral and material interests of the creators that we
seek to protect in the UDHR or the ICESCR. Like the computer
and the chair, however, or like an easement, a tenancy, a springing
executory interest, or a right of way, a trademark right is a
property interest. It is treated like a property interest, and
measured by sticks in the bundle of property rights-the right to
use, the right to transfer, the right to exclude.
To the extent that trademarks are increasingly implicated
within in a human rights framework, it will be important to
consider the consequences on a practical level. It is important to
note, for example, that human rights are not a zero-sum game, nor
are they mutually exclusive. The realization of the human rights
179. Burgess, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 1059. In Burgess, the court stated that when a business
is transferred and no mention is made of the business's trademark, it is presumed to have
transferred as well. Id. at 1055 (citing Am. Dirigold Corp. v. Dirigold Metals Corp., 125 F.2d
446, 453 (6th Cir. 1942)). Therefore, the court presumed that the mark transferred to the
U.S. Department of the Treasury when it seized the entire business. Burgess, supra note
176, at 1059 Next, the court held that the assignment was not in gross, and therefore valid,
because prostitution remained the core of the business and the new owners used the same
building as the previous owner, though they moved it to a different location, and maintained
the same interior design and furnishings. Id. Although the trademark was not used during
the two years from when it was seized and when it was sold, this non-use was excused, as
no one could reasonably expect the government to operate the brothel in the interim, given
the certain public outcry that would ensue, simply to maintain the mark. Id. at 1061.
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enumerated in Article 27 of the UDHR, Article 15 of the ICESCR,
and indeed Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR are both
interdependent and dependent on other unspecified human rights
guaranteed in those instruments. The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties instructs that treaties shall be interpreted "in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose. ' 180 With regard to human rights treaties, an
interpretation must "take into account the specific characteristics
of human rights treaties"'81 and construe provisions in a manner
"favourable to the individual."'8 2 Limitations on human rights
contained in the treaties should, consequently, be construed
narrowly. 8 3 Accordingly, the right to the protection of the moral
and material interests of creators must be in some ways balanced
with the right to own property alone and in association with
others. 84 These rights must also be balanced with the right to
freedom of expression, which includes the right to information and
ideas of all kinds; 8 5 the right to the full development of the human
180. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
31, 8 I.L.M. 679.
181. Magdalena Sepulveda, The Nature of the Obligations Under the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 8 (2003).
182. Craven, supra note 4, at 3; see also Yu, supra note 1, at 1047.
183. Craven, supra note 4, at 3. Craven noted, however, that "the obscure and imprecise
nature of many of [the] terms [in the ICESCR] frequently leaves important questions
unanswered." Id.
184. See UDHR, supra note 3, art. 17; International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 5(d)(v), Dec. 21, 1965, G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), U.N. Doc.
A/6014, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/cerd.pdf [hereinafter ICEAFRD]; Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on
Human Rights) protocol 1, art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter ECHR]; American
Convention on Human Rights art. 21, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123;
ACHPR, supra note 115, art. 4 ("Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be
entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily
deprived of this right.").
185. See UDHR, supra note 3, art. 19; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 19 2, Mar. 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXl), U.N. Doc. A/6316 [hereinafter
ICCPR]; ECHR, supra note 184, art. 5; American Declaration of Human Rights art. 13,
O.A.S. Res. XXX (1948), O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEAISer. L/V/I.4 Rev. (1965); ACHPR, supra note
115, art. 9 ("1. Every individual shall have the right to receive information. 2. Every
individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinions within the law.").
personality;18 6 and the right to cultural participation, 8 7 including
cultural rights of specific groups.
88
One area in which human rights discourse may find conflict is
that of indigenous peoples' rights. Within the framework of human
rights, indigenous peoples' rights must be balanced alongside the
rights of trademark owners, and, as human rights discourse begins
to consider issues of trademark rights, those rights may be
antagonistic to the ability of indigenous groups to enjoy certain
cultural rights respecting cultural participation, identity, and self-
determination. One of the most apparent examples of such a
conflict involves the appropriation of aspects of indigenous cultural
identity to signify the goods and services of non-indigenous,
commercial interests. Under the Lanham Act, U.S. trademark law
bars registration of marks that present a false association with an
individual or group, as well as marks that are disparaging. In the
well-known Washington Redskins litigation, the plaintiffs, seven
Native Americans, alleged that the REDSKINS mark was
disparaging to Native Americans. The TTAB held that a
trademark will be barred from registration where the likely
meaning of the trademark is disparaging to a substantial
composite of the referenced group of people. On appeal, however,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that the
defense of laches applied, and that court's subsequent grant of
summary judgment to the plaintiff, Pro-Football Inc., was affirmed
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.1
8 9
Laches could easily preclude the successful effort to assert rights
under the Lanham Act on the part not just of the particular
plaintiffs in the Washington Redskins case but also, given the
particular history of indigenous communities, of indigenous
peoples more generally. While there is a public interest exception
to the laches defense, it has not been used to effectively protect
these types of claims. Furthermore, the Section 2(a) bar to
registration under the Lanham Act affects only registration of
trademarks, not their use in commerce. To the extent that
186. UDHR, supra note 3, art. 26 2. See also ICESCR, supra note 3, art. 13 1.
187. See ICEAFRD, supra note 184, art. 5(e)(vi); Additional Protocol, supra note 32, art.
14; ACHPR, supra note 115, art. 17 2 ("Every individual may freely, take part in the
cultural life of his community.").
188. See ICCPR, supra note 185, art. 27; Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women art. 13(c), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 513; Convention on
the Rights of the Child art. 31, Nov. 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. A/44/49;
International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their
Families art. 31, U.N. Doc. AJRES/45/158 (1991).
189. Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 1999 TTAB LEXIS 181 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 1999), rev'd,
284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003), plaintiffs petition for summary judgment granted, 567 F.
Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2008), affrd, 565 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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trademarks are a property interest with human rights
implications, the courts may more frequently confront questions of
conflict with peoples' rights to cultural life and self-determination.
As the debate over intellectual property rights and human
rights develops, it is important to recognize the various forms of
intellectual property rights, to realize their differences, and to
distinguish their treatment within the structure of human rights
law. While a strong argument can be made that copyrights and
patent rights fall squarely within the language protecting the
moral and material interests of creators, found in fundamental
human rights treaties, trademark rights are materially different in
kind and in function.
Trademark rights involve key sticks in the bundle of property
rights: the right to use, the right to transfer, and the right to
exclude. Like many real property interests, these rights are not
unlimited, but, like all property, the right itself is defined by these
sticks in the bundle, and is valued accordingly. Importantly, if a
trademark owner fails to protect these rights and allows them to
be used by others, it results in the ultimate tragedy of the
commons, wherein the trademark rights themselves (not to
mention the existence of the mark itself) disappear.
Whether or not it is "well settled" even today that
trademarks are property de jure, they are certainly property de
facto, and as such, like the computer on which I type, the chair in
which I sit, or the glass of wine I will drink after I finish this
article-or, like an easement, a leasehold interest, or a
determinable fee-trademark rights may be implicated in human
rights discourse that protects individuals from being arbitrarily
deprived of their property. Furthermore, including trademarks
within a discussion of human rights is not without practical
consequence. For example, the property interests of trademark
owners must be balanced with other fundamental rights, and
may in form and/or substance conflict with one or more of those
rights, such as the right to cultural identity of indigenous groups.
It is without equivocation that I posit that trademark rights are
not human rights per se; there is no fundamental right to own a
trademark that one gets simply by being born. Trademarks are
not as immiscible as oil and water, nor are they a combination so
great that it becomes larger than the sum of its parts, as
chocolate and peanut butter. However, trademarks clearly are
property interests, and as such they have human rights
implications. The intersection of trademarks with human rights
is something that has consequences both theoretical and
practical-which, particularly following the Anheuser-Busch
BUDWEISER case in Europe, will become only more relevant on
both a domestic and an international scale in the coming years.
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